By Lam Wuor, Canada.
December 5, 2014(Nyamilepedia) — I begin by addressing power-sharing institutions in terms of short- and long-term implications, examining the possible lack of fit between powers sharing as an incentive to reach agreements during the negotiation phase while proving a source of conflict during the longer-term consolidation phase. African institutions are not skillful with power sharing division between the two rivals, looking at the details on experiments in the IGAD strategic principles of mediation are partisan since the beginning of peace talks in Addis Ababa; with this information at hand, I distinguish among three forms: inclusive decision-making shared decision-making in the branches of government by the representatives of the major segments of opposition and government; partitioned decision-making, a limited of interim period.
Power-sharing transitional governments are common ingredients of peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. Power sharing guarantees the participation of representatives of Significant groups in political decision making, and especially in the executive, but also in legislature, judiciary, police and army,
By dividing power among rival groups during the transition, power sharing reduces the danger that one party will become dominant and threaten the security of others. However, the good example, is Liberia, Burundi, Nepal, Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of countries where power-sharing transitional governments were responsible for guiding the complex processes of demobilization and re-integration of combatants, return of displaced persons, preparation of elections and the negotiation of new constitutions.
Not surprisingly, power-sharing institutions have attracted considerable support in contemporary Africa. Following where civil wars are, south Sudan governments have not understand that signaling a willingness to collaborate with insurgents in national reconciliation governments is important in order to maintain the country as a single entity; therefore, power sharing with Salva Kiir regime looks like handicapped by a lack of shared honestly and aspirations
I would say that sharing power in the transitional executive and legislature, would include civil society is an important role to play in assisting both parties governments to manage our countries’ political transition. The fact that a government of national unity will be in place is often would be seen as the return to ‘normality’ and as the beginning of reconstruction.
When parties sign on to a power-sharing agreement, what does this compromise entail?
In the absence of elections, what mechanisms should be adopted to identify the participants of national dialogue and other public-participation efforts? How the extent of inclusion and Participation should is defined? There are no perfect answers to these questions, and external actors can play an important role in facilitating the discussions on the eligibility criteria and decision-making procedures of consultative mechanisms. Inevitably, public-participation efforts following peace agreements and lengthy civil conflicts will be flawed and at least partially manipulated by elites. Adopting transparent selection and decision-making rules may go some way to increasing the public’s influence in the political process. Also, relying on multi-step selection processes, led by credible national leaders and independent commissions, could be beneficial. However, these efforts are unlikely to overcome the inherently contentious nature of expanded political participation, and third parties should remain engaged to assist in managing these challenges. Of course, this peaceful transfer of power would be incomplete and incompatible.
Transitional periods, institution-building and constitutional negotiations Constitutional discussions go to the heart of the most divisive issues facing a country: the structure of state institutions and the long-term sharing of power within them, the rights of minorities, and the state’s obligations toward the citizens. Experience has shown that lasting and legitimate state institutions tend to result from lengthy deliberation among a wide range of national elites and from meaningful public participation.
There are difficulties ahead of us if power sharing succeeded what if the governments are not eager to create avenues for wide political participation, which allows opposition groups to influence decisions. Incorporating new views and interests in the political process disturbs the delicate balance of power negotiated in the peace agreement. The second difficulty is related to the question of who decides, in the absence of elections, what groups are to be included in the transitional political process and through what mechanism. Some groups would believe that inclusive political processes should begin only after state institutions have been rebuilt and the rule of law established.
The Short- and Long-Term Implications
The short-term motives for adopting power-sharing arrangements may conflict with the long-term incentives to consolidate political power. During negotiations on a peace agreement, power-sharing institutions are attractive to civil society for they hold out the prospect of inclusion in decision-making activities and, therefore, the ability to protect the interests of their communal membership. In times of crisis, the presence of a community’s representatives within both rebel and government acts as some reassurance to that community that its vital interests will not be ignored. With the state a dangerous actor in terms of allocating resources and providing security to the victims
The rebel leadership should make sure and reason that all government intuitions to be shut down and reform the legislature or other decision bodies are to be unable to protect victims. Thus power-sharing arrangements respond to rebels has right to participation in affairs of state. Notwithstanding all these facts, the power sharing formula should not be considered as a silver cannonball and a final and lasting solution to all difficulties. There are unresolved conflicts in south Sudan and as long as they occur, the power sharing formula will be disposed to to crisis and failure. As a consequence of this situation, south Sudan will remain prone to violence and will constantly need foreign intervention.
Author is South Sudan citizen living in Canada can be reached @ firstname.lastname@example.org